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ABSTRACT 
 
 
While competitive tendering in urban public transport has been widely applied in the developed 
world, in many developing countries particularly Africa, this has not been the case. In 
Zimbabwe, competitive tendering was identified in 2012 as a tool to address the urban 
transport challenges emanating from a deregulated urban public transport market. To date, 
the tendering option has not been implemented. This paper examines the institutional 
preparedness to bus route tendering in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe. A mixed-methods 
research paradigm was used to obtain data and information from three relevant transport 
stakeholder clusters comprising public, private and academia sectors. The findings of the 
study have shown that the key stakeholders have a clear understanding of what competitive 
tendering entails, but implementation is hindered inter alia by lack of infrastructure and support 
systems, lack of commitment to policy implementation and a reluctance to interfere with the 
status quo, which generates revenue for the economy through both legal and illegal means. 
The study is of value to other developing countries, particularly Africa, which may draw lessons 
from the Zimbabwe experiences. The study recommended the need for a detailed diagnostic 
study to analyse the deep rooted political and economic factors or pressures that impede a 
movement from the status quo. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
While competitive tendering in urban public transport has been widely applied in the developed 
world, in many developing countries particularly Africa, this has not been the case. During the 
period that competitive tendering was gaining momentum in the developed countries, the 
provision of formal public transport in most African cities was declining. According to the World 
Bank (2002), the historical trends in the decline of formal public transport in cities of Africa 
have much in common albeit variations in detail from country to country. Gwilliam (2008) noted 
that, the post attainment of independence in many countries in Africa, the privately operated 
bus companies (invariably from former colonial masters) were subjected to government 
controls. The controls which mainly constrained the bus companies the freedom to adjust fares 
in line with increasing costs resulted in the withdrawal of expatriate companies. For some 
governments, fares became a political tool as keeping them down would curry favour with the 
voting public.  The failure of public bus companies to keep pace with rapidly-expanding cities, 
and the political unwillingness to maintain real fares rendered the formal transport services 
uneconomic. In some cases, bus companies were taken into national ownership (nationalised) 
but continued to operate as protected monopolies managed by inexperienced personnel. 
Other factors that contributed to the decline of formal public transport include corruption and 
institutional inadequacy Gwilliam (2008). Corruption undermined sector efficiency at the 
expense of operational efficiency while the movement from the previously expatriate operated 
companies to the controlled regime was met by a gap in managerial experience. As the 
dominant bus companies declined, they were replaced by a fragmented informal public 
transport system comprising of small vehicles. The growth of the informal transport sector has 
been unprecedented and Union Internationale des Transports Publics, (UITP, 2008) conceded 
that an attempt to estimate the number of transport units is a great challenge. The dramatic 
growth in transport providers has resulted in a chaotic situation characterised by bad driving 
habits, cut-throat competition, and high levels of accidents and congestion. 
 
The above trend was given impetus by the intervention of the Bretton Woods Institutes (the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund), which changed the configuration of most 
economies in Africa. Dubbed the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), this 
intervention significantly influenced the future developments in the provision of urban public 
transport. In essence, ESAP was geared towards economic reforms and removal of price and 
fiscal controls in order to allow the market to direct the performance of the economy. According 
to Saunders (1996), the areas that were targeted by the reforms included trade and currency 
devaluation, movement towards high interest rates, reduction of expenditure, and removal of 
consumer subsidies and privatization of public enterprises. In respect of public transport, these 
economic reforms ushered a new era in many cities of Sub-Saharan Africa. The urban public 
transport sector was deregulated by facilitating market entry to private transporters and thus 
the market was mainly captured by the informal sector.  
 
The state of public transport in Harare, Zimbabwe is similar to that of most developing 
countries. Urban public transport is solely provided by the informal sector which is 
characterised by small and old vehicles, discourteous and dangerous driving and excessive 
supply of transport services resulting in congestion, slow speeds and an unpalatable urban 
environment. The Government of Zimbabwe in its first National Transport Policy statement of 
2012, enunciated inter alia the goal to “ensure the provision of adequate, reliable, efficient and 
demand responsive transport service in urban areas”. To achieve this goal, competitive 
tendering for services was identified as one of the tools to improve the provision of urban 
transport services. Since the announcement of this tool, five years ago, there has not been 
any action towards the implementation of competitive tendering. The five-year gap of inactivity 
to introduce route bus tendering has prompted the authors of this paper to explore the 
stakeholders’ knowledge of what route tendering entails and their views on the City of Harare’s 
preparedness to implement route tendering. The country has no experience of route tendering 
and there are very few examples in Africa to learn from. The following questions will be 
addressed: What are the views of stakeholders on competitive route tendering? What benefits 
can accrue from a route tendering system? What pre-conditions are necessary for the 
successful implementation of route tendering? Are there ideal routes which can be tendered? 
Is the prevailing urban public transport institutional framework conducive and prepared for 
route tendering?  
 
Literature review 
 
According to GTZ (2001:4), the tendering process entails “the creation of competition for the 
right to provide bus services”. Cox, Love and Newton (no date:3) defined competitive tendering 
as the procurement of public transport services from the competitive market by the public 
authority “awarding service contracts to the lowest responsible and responsive proposer”. 
Competitive tendering therefore accords a successful tenderer an exclusive right to deliver a 
service in accordance with predetermined rubrics. Promotion of competition and delivery of a 
service that offers value for money to both the tenderer (an operator) and the purchaser 
(Government or Local Authority) are some of the classical arguments that favoured the 
competitive tendering practice. In the United Kingdom, the deregulation of local buses was 
pinned on the argument to drive costs down and improve efficiency.  
 
Fundamentally, there are two forms of management or service contractual schemes for 
competitive tendering in public transport: gross cost contract and net cost contract. The gross 
cost contract or comprehensive contract defines a service to be provided by an operator with 
pre-specified conditions (such as subsidies and quality of service) with all the revenue 
collected being retained by the authority. Here, the revenue risk is borne by the local 
authorities while the production risk is accepted by the transport operator. While the gross cost 
contract is advantageous in avoiding on-street competition for passengers, its disadvantage 
is that the operator has no direct incentive to ensure revenue collection and is not concerned 
with the efficient operation of the route (World Bank Group & PPIAF, 2006).  
 
The net cost contract places both the production and revenue risks on the operator. The 
regulatory authority grants monopoly rights to an operator for a given price (or subsidy) for a 
specific period. The operator retains all the revenue. The operator is therefore compelled to 
forecast his future costs and revenues. Hybrid arrangements are also possible, where a 
patronage-related incentive is introduced into a gross cost contract. According to the World 
Bank Group & PPIAF, (2006), the net cost contract restricts the authority’s capacity to make 
desirable changes to the network if such changes adversely affect revenue. The operator is 
also likely to make conservative estimates of revenue in order to reduce his financial risk and 
consequently, the authority may end up paying more for a net-cost (Ibid). 
 
There are different ways in which a contract can be awarded. A contract can be procured by 
negotiation or through competitive tendering. Wallis, Bray and Webster (2010), noted the main 
merit of competitive tendering in “securing the provision of service at efficient cost levels, 
particularly in cases where services were previously provided by an inefficient monopoly 
operator”. Wallis et al (2010) also identified “adverse selection” and “winner’s curse” as some 
of the shortcomings of competitive tendering. In case of the former, the selected bidder may 
have exploited the flows in the tender and not necessarily able to offer the best value for 
money. In the latter case, an operator may bid at an unjustifiably low price and renegotiate for 
a revised price when the agreed price becomes unrealistic. 
 
Negotiation can be undertaken to extend an existing operators contract or with a new entrant. 
For an existing operator, continuity of service, reputation of operator and past experience are 
some of the criteria upon which the negotiation option can be preferred. Wallis et al (2010) 
cited benchmark costs and performance measures as key inputs to the negotiation outcome. 
In some operating situations, negotiation can be a fait accompli as it is dictated by the 
operating environment. A good example is the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, where a negotiated contract was used to pacify the displaced 
minibus operators (Seftel and Rikhotso, 2014).  
 
The earnest drive towards competitive tendering has its roots in the United Kingdom when 
outside London, in 1986, urban transport was deregulated and competitive tendering was 
used to fill the gaps that the market did not provide commercially. In London, routes were 
tendered and this entailed the London Buses Limited (a subsidiary of London Transport (LT)) 
to compete against privately owned operators for the opportunity to run individual bus routes 
on behalf of LT (Transport for London 2003). Following this liberalisation of local buses in the 
United Kingdom, competitive tendering has become a trend and a crucial tool in ensuring 
control of urban and inter-city transport passenger markets in many other countries in Europe. 
Gulibon (2006) observed the spread of competitive tendering for public transport services to 
countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, France, Belgium, Poland, Germany, 
Italy, Australia and New Zealand among others. By and large, competitive tendering has 
yielded positive outcomes as evidenced by a decrease in vehicle operating costs, an 
improvement in a more customer oriented attitude leading to customer satisfaction, an 
improvement of vehicles, service expansion, increased bus productivity and ridership (Van de 
Velde and Savelberg, 2016; White 2009; Gulibon, 2006; and Valkama, Anttiroiko and 
Kankaanpää, 2015). 
 
In Africa, competitive tendering for public transport is a grey area. The only country that is 
known to practice competitive tendering is South Africa. According to Walters and Heyns 
(2012), South Africa’s policy of competitive tendering has been in existence since the mid-
1980s and the actual tendering process started in 1997. Trade unions were not in favour of 
the competitive tendering system as in some cases employees had their wages eroded when 
changing from one operator to the other (Ibid).  
 
Overview of public transport in Harare 
 
According to Gwilliam (2000), there is much in common in the story of passenger transport in 
many postcolonial African countries. With the exception of South Africa, all are dependent on 
road-based modes. In Zimbabwe, before the country’s democratisation, urban public transport 
was provided by United Transport Overseas Services (UTOS). UTOS, a privately owned 
British company operated a sole public transport service in Harare using conventional buses. 
The agreement (gross cost) prohibited other operators to operate a service within a 26 
kilometre radius of the post office. The company was mandated to provide a reliable (albeit 
not specified) transport service within the franchise area. Annual fare adjustments were 
negotiated with the local authority and the company got a subsidy through a guaranteed 20% 
return on capital employed. Of concern to Government was the inadequate and unreliable 
public transport that was evident in long passenger waiting times.   
 
Upon attaining independence in 1980, the Government gradually abandoned the monopolistic 
franchised arrangement in favour of a more liberalised market approach. The direct 
participation of the national government in the urban public transport sector involved direct 
control of fares and a further introduction of other parallel forms of transport. The “pirate taxis” 
that naturally grew in response to demand in the pre-independence era were formally 
recognised and christened “Emergency Taxis” as a temporary mode of transport to 
supplement public transport demand in Harare and other urban areas in the country. As the 
name “emergency” suggests, it was a reaction to a public transport crisis. The vehicles were 
small sedan cars, invariably Peugeot 404. As such emergency taxis were established as a 
new public transport mode and were required to obtain permits from the Ministry of Transport 
which specified routes, passenger capacity of the vehicles and fares. However, fares were 
recommended for approval to government by the local authorities. The local authorities were 
mandated to provide emergency taxis ranks and monitor and enforce their proper use. 
Emergency taxis were not violating the provisions of the franchise agreement as legally, they 
were not considered a public transport mode due to their limited capacity. The temporality of 
emergency taxis persisted for 14 years, from 1983 to 1996. This is despite the observable 
nature of traffic congestion caused by the emergency taxis in the Central Business Districts of 
major urban centres. This indecisiveness of government caused numerous traffic flow 
problems as well as posing unhealthy competition to the formal public transport system. 
Despite all this, the Government of Zimbabwe still could not adopt a definite policy stance on 
emergency taxis, hence they thrived under the ‘blind eye’ of the government.  
 
The advent of the ESAP in 1993, deregulated urban passenger transport, paving the way for 
privately operated public transport to operate in urban areas. The privately operated vehicles 
(minibuses) have grown at an unprecedented rate ultimately forcing the conventional bus 
operator out of the market.  
 
Survey Design  
 
This study explores key stakeholders’ knowledge of what route tendering entails and their 
views on the preparedness to bus route tendering in Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe. A 
mixed-methods research paradigm included in-depth interviews, a focus group discussion and 
a questionnaire survey of key stakeholders in examining the institutional preparedness to bus 
route tendering in Harare. Quantitative data were obtained from three relevant clusters; public 
sector cluster (Regulatory), private sector cluster (Operators) and academia cluster (Table 1). 
From 75 closed-ended questionnaires, 70 valid responses were obtained.  
 
Table 1: Clusters surveyed 
Stakeholder Tools Applied 
A. Regulatory Cluster 
i. The Central Government 
a. The Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure 
Development 
b. The Ministry of Local Government, Public Works 
and National Housing (Department of Physical 
Planning) 
c. The Ministry of Home Affairs (Zimbabwe Republic 
Police National Traffic) 
ii. The Local Government 
a. The Harare City Council (H.C.C) 
 
 
 
 Questionnaire  
 
B. Operators Cluster 
i. Urban Public Transport Operators’ Associations  
a. The Zimbabwe National Commuter Omnibus 
Operators Organisation, (ZNCOOO) and  
b. The Greater Harare Commuter Omnibus Operators 
Association, (GHACO). 
 
 Questionnaire 
 Focus Group 
Discussions 
 
 
C. Academia Cluster 
i. Universities 
a. University of Zimbabwe 
b. Chinhoyi University of Technology 
c. Great Zimbabwe University 
ii. Polytechnics 
a. Harare Polytechnic 
iii. Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport 
 
 Questionnaire 
 
 
 
In addition, eight interviews were conducted with senior personnel or heads of departments of 
the three clusters using an open-ended questionnaire (qualitative data).  
 
FINDINGS 
 
Demographic profile of respondents and participants 
The 70 survey respondents comprised of 53 male and 17 females, broken down into 23 from 
the regulatory sector, 41 academia and 7 private (operator) cluster. The age of the 
respondents were, 2 below 20 years, 40 between 21 and 30 years, 19 between 31 and 40 
years, 6 between 41 and 50 years and 3 between 51 and 60 years. The 8 in-depth qualitative 
interviews comprised 7 males and 1 female. The 8 participants were broken down as follows: 
4 from the regulatory cluster, 3 academia and 1 from the private operator’s sector. The 
average age of the 8 participants was 38 years, ranging from 25 to 63 years. 
 
Understanding the competitive tendering concept 
As stated in the literature review, competitive tendering of bus services is not widely practised 
in Africa. Therefore, before considering whether an institutional set up is ready for bus 
tendering, it is necessary to first ask whether there is a good understanding of what 
competitive tendering entails. From the in-depth interviews, it followed that all eight 
participants had a good understanding of the competitive tendering concept. The predominant 
words used to describe competitive tendering were ‘concessioning’, ‘franchising’ and ‘bidding’. 
Two definitions to define competitive tendering given by two participants in the academic and 
regulatory sectors are:   
 
“Controlled competition mechanism that addresses the many disadvantages of public 
transport monopolies and outright uncontrolled competition. In essence it provides an 
alternative to the undesirable extreme i.e. the absence of competition (monopoly) and the 
existence of unmanaged/uncontrolled competition” [Participant from the academic sector] 
 
“A concession system where transport services are subject to open tender within a defined 
operational framework” [Participant from the regulatory sector] 
 
Desirability of a tendered system 
 
To ascertain the desirability of the tendered system, respondents were asked two questions: 
‘Is competitive bus tendering the way to go?’ and, ‘Should competitive bus tendering be 
introduced in Harare?’ Table 2 shows respondents’ views to the former question. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Bus tendering in public transport is the way to go 
 Frequency Percentage 
Strongly Disagree 13 18.6 
Disagree 3 4.3 
Don’t know 12 17.1 
Agree 9 12.9 
Strongly Agree 33 47.1 
N 79 100 
 
From Table 3 it follows that 60% of respondents agreed and strongly agreed, 12.9% (Agree) 
and 47.1% (Strongly Agree) respectively with bus tendering. In response to the question 
whether competitive bus tendering should be introduced in the City of Harare, 64 respondents 
(91%) answered in the affirmative. All eight participants in the qualitative interviews supported 
competitive tendering.  
 
The above result can be explained by the state of public transport in Harare. Zimbabwe’s 
urban public transport is provided by two main modes; minibuses (locally dubbed as kombis) 
which carry 18 passengers, although legally they must carry a maximum of 14 passengers 
and private motor vehicles used as public transport, mainly for shuttling the intra CBD routes. 
These forms of public transport violate traffic rules with impunity, they engage in dangerous 
driving behaviour as they compete for passengers. Therefore, the consensus that the Harare 
City Council should adopt a bus tendering system, is pinned on the hope that unreliable public 
transport, poor driver behaviour and other negative environmental externalities would be 
better managed.  
 
Respondents were further asked their preference on the nature of the contract. Of the 70 
respondents, 64% preferred the contract based on route while 36% favoured an area based 
contract. Six qualitative participants were in favour of a route tendering contract, one preferring 
area based and the eighth preferred a combination of both. All the 70 respondents and 8 
participants were of the view that bus tendering should be applied to high density areas as 
opposed to low density areas. High density routes were those that serve the high density 
suburbs of Harare where there are higher population densities per square metre. This high 
population density provides a proxy indicator of high ridership which enables profitable and 
sustainable operations ceteris paribus. The route based tender was preferred because of its 
perceived ease of service levels monitoring and management. Respondents felt that it would 
be difficult to monitor service levels if an operator is given the whole area to operate as the 
area may constitute a complex network of routes some of which may be served well and some 
may not. Some respondents noted that a route based system helps in improved network 
planning for public transport and cancelation can be done ‘overnight’ if need be. There were 
no respondents who cited low demand loss making routes as ideal for tendering. The desire 
for a more regulated and monitored bus service contract was further reinforced by the opinion 
that the given route must have service conditions based contracts upon which service 
performance would be evaluated.  
 
Desired type of contract 
 
The monopolistic type of contract was unpopular (Figure 1) in comparison with one where the 
regulatory agency retains planning responsibility. Reasons proffered were varied and 
included: the need to tie the operator to perform, avoiding a situation where the operator 
becomes ‘a judge and jury’, and need to strike a balance between the requirements of the 
commuter (affordability) and those of the operator (profits). Furthermore and as illustrated in 
Figure 2, it was found that respondents were more in favour of an open / formal tender process 
(58.6%) when selecting potential service providers as compared to negotiated contracts 
(41.4%).  
 
 
Figure 1: Contract type - monopolistic/specified           Figure 2: Contract type– open/negotiated 
 
An open tender was thought to provide the following advantages: It allows various operators 
to participate and there is transparency and fairness in the tender adjudication process. The 
‘best’ operator would win the contract. This would lower chances of corrupt activities. 
Corruption was cited as a main reason against a negotiated contract and two respondents 
from the qualitative survey remarked: “The political system in Harare is highly susceptible to 
corruption and inconsistences. Therefore, an open and formal tender creates room for 
accountability on all parties involved” [Respondent 1] and “The negotiated tender is not 
transparent and in a politically charged environment like Zimbabwe can open opportunities for 
the contract to be awarded to a provider who does not necessarily have sufficient capacity to 
provide the service standards envisaged” [Respondent 2]. Respondents favouring negotiated 
contracts viewed this model as providing an opportunity for the operator to suggest some 
innovative ways of offering service which when debated will mutually benefit the public and 
the operator. One respondent commented “With an open tender, you may not get a serious 
service provider whereas parameters can be set for a negotiated one. Some open tenders 
can be disguised”. [Respondent 3] 
 
Contract duration 
 
Table 3 illustrates the respondents’ preference on the duration of a contract. 
 
Table 3: Preferred contract duration 
Period (Years) Number of respondents 
preferring 
Percentage Cumulative 
Percentage 
Up to 3  37 53 53 
3.1 to 4 7 10 63 
4.1 to 6 10 14 77 
6.1 to 10 5 7 84 
0 20 40 60 80 100
Contract B  (Specifies
service conditions)
Contract A (grants
monopoly)
Percentage of respondents preferring
0 20 40 60 80
Open Tender
Negotiated Tender
Percentage of respondents preferring
More than 10 11 16 100 
Total 70 100  
 
As illustrated in Table 3, the majority of respondents are in favour of short-term contracts. Fifty 
three percent (53%) of respondents were of the view that contracts for a tendered bus service 
must have a maximum period of three years. Generally, a relatively short-term contract was 
envisaged not to create a high level of commitment while a long-term contract often creates 
loopholes for corruption in the service performance evaluation and subsequent renewal of 
contract. Another advantage of short-term contracts that emerged was that operators had no 
room for relaxation because of the fear of non-contract renewal, if performance is below set 
standards. Longer contractual arrangements were envisaged to be problematic in extreme 
cases of poor performance by operators. It would be very difficult to terminate the contract 
before the stipulated number of years. Thus, passengers would endure the poor service levels 
for a longer period of time. Despite the greater weight placed on short-term contracts, some 
of the participants’ (from the 8 qualitative survey) expressed the view that operating a fleet of 
buses is a capital intensive venture with slow returns, thus entailing a relatively longer period 
to enable the operator to realise profits.  
 
Benefits of competitive tendering system 
 
In summary, respondents were of the view that a route based contract introduced via an open 
tender preferably for high density routes with a maximum contract period of six years was an 
ideal bus tendering system for Harare. This model is envisaged to achieve a reliable service 
(67%) and affordable service (29%) as the major benefits (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3: Opinion on benefits of bus tendering system 
 
Respondents who participated in the qualitative interview acknowledged the following benefits 
from an open competitive tendering system; getting value for money, transparency, creating 
order on the road as operators will not rush for passengers and thus reducing competition in 
the market. From this discussion, it is evident that the relevant stakeholders envisage route 
competitive tendering as a viable alternative to the current system. The next section analyses 
the reasons that contribute to the delay in the introduction of the competitive tendering system. 
 
DISCUSSION 
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An opinion survey on bus tendering in Harare across the public, regulators and operators 
revealed that there is greater desire for a tendered bus system to be introduced in Harare. 
This desire is mainly derived from the present dissatisfaction and disgruntlement with 
operational behaviour of kombis and other private vehicles operating as public transport. A 
competitive tendering system is perceived to ‘solve’ or at least ‘ease’ some of the problems 
posed by the minibuses (kombis and small sedan cars locally known as ‘mushikashikas’. 
However, the following factors were found to militate against the effective adoption and 
implementation of a bus tendering system in Harare. 
 
Lack of requisite infrastructure and support systems  
 
A cross examination on competitive bus tendering shows that whilst, the desire is there, the 
Harare City Council (Local Planning Authority) and Central Government are not prepared and 
ready to implement competitive bus tendering in the near future. This is supported by a 
composite analysis on selected preconditions necessary for competitive tendering (Figure 4), 
these range from supporting infrastructure to skilled manpower to design and implement a 
tendered bus system.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: The readiness and preparedness for City of Harare to bus tendering 
 
The situation obtaining on the ground corroborates the picture depicted in the graph above. 
Road infrastructure and termini in Harare are in a bad state. Currently, the Department of 
Transport at the City is operating with employees who do not have the requisite qualifications 
in transport. Lack of a well-managed planning regime was a dominant view expressed by 
respondents who participated in the qualitative interview. One respondent argued on the need 
for managerial discipline: “It’s not just a matter of know-how, it’s the discipline and consistency 
in management required that is lacking in the planning regime”.  
 
In the event that Government decides to implement competitive tendering, is the operating 
industry ready, capable and willing to embrace this form of transformation? Both the present 
urban minibus operators and long distance operators (also dominated by minibuses) are 
against competitive tendering. Their reluctance to embrace competitive tendering stems 
mainly from their lack of capacity and experience to operate conventional bus services and 
inability to raise adequate funds to buy buses. 
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There are a few buses operating on the long distance market. The buses are owned by 
individuals and the fleet sizes are negligible. The bus operators are not interested in the urban 
market, and have cited uneconomic tariffs and the need for a subsidy. If they have to enter 
the urban bus market through tendering, there is need to restructure their businesses and 
acquire more buses. High capital is required to buy buses and it is very unlikely that they can 
secure such funds from the local banks which are also experiencing their own challenges. 
 
From the foregoing discussion, the local operators do not have the means and capacity to 
operate formal urban public transport. An option that the Government can take is to allow 
foreign based operators to tender. Such a move that is likely to result in the displacement of 
local operators will be vehemently resisted unless arrangements are put in place for their 
incorporation. The size of buses (small, medium or large) and duration of contract are real 
issues that the Government would need to weigh in a tendering scenario. If larger buses rather 
than smaller buses are used, longer contracts make sense and vice versa.   Therefore, the 
drive to competitive tendering is not simple as there are considerable challenges that need to 
be carefully considered.  
 
Revenue generation versus negative externalities dilemma 
 
The desire for a formal public transport system in Zimbabwe’s major urban areas has been on 
the country’s policy agenda for a long time. The first transport policy document, after the 
country’s independence in 1980, enunciating the issue of a formalised transport, included 
mass transit and bus tendering in the National Transport Study of 1985. Specifically, for 
Harare, the Local Traffic Subject Plan of 1997, proposal number 30 highlighted the need for a 
more organised formal public transport system. The prevailing National Transport Policy 
instituted in 2012 again emphasised competitive tendering as a strategic move to ensure 
sanity in the urban public transport market.  
 
Despite all these policy pronouncements, competitive tendering has not been implemented 
and is unlikely to be implemented in the near future. One such hurdle is that the public 
transport industry in Zimbabwe has become a cash cow for Government. The current poorly 
unregulated urban public transport market has witnessed unrestricted free entry of operators 
to such an extent that there is an oversupply of minibuses. An oversupply of vehicles means 
increased revenue generation to the fiscus through both legal (vehicle taxes) and illegal 
(corrupt) means. Although Government does not admit that the informal transport sector is 
contributing revenue to the fiscus, many respondents alluded to this view. In addition, it was 
also pointed out that a significant number of influential people in Government including law 
enforcement agents owned minibuses. 
Table 4 shows a comprehensive financial contribution by the minibus industry in Harare 
assuming there are 8000 (the figure that is often quoted) vehicles in Harare. These were 
submitted to the Minister of Finance and Economic Development last year during the 2017 
national budget consultations done in 2016 by the Ministry of Transport. 
 
Table 4: Estimated financial contribution of minibuses to the national budget 
 
 
Cost Description 
Supplier Annual 
Unit Price 
($) 
No. of 
units 
Total Annual 
Economic 
Contribution 
($) 
Fuel (30L*312*$1.23) Fuel Co. 11 513 8 000 92 104 000
Presumptive Tax  Ministry of Finance 700 8 000 5 600 000
Paye Ministry of Finance 480 8 000 3 840 000
Passenger insurance Insurance Council of 
Zimbabwe (ICZ) 
236 8 000 1 888 000
Vehicle insurance ICZ / Traffic Safety 
Council of Zimbabwe 
(TSCZ) 
264 8 000 2 112 000
Route Authority Road Motor 
Transportation (RMT) 
75 8 000 600 000
Vehicle licence Zimbabwe National 
Roads Authority 
(ZINARA) 
60 8 000 480 000
Rank disc (*3) City of Harare 300 8 000 2 400 000
VID fitness  Vehicle Inspection 
Department (VID) 
40 8 000 320 000
Vehicle radio license Zimbabwe Broadcasting 
Corporation (ZBC) 
30 8 000 240 000
Re-test – medical Medical Doctors 20 8 000 160 000
Route Authority Form City of Harare 100 8 000 800 000
Re-test – defensive TSCZ 13 8 000 104 000
Re-test - vehicle hire Driving School 10 8 000 80 000
Operators' license RMT 42 8 000 336 000
VID garage report  VID 20 8 000 160 000
Total Direct 
Contribution 
   111 224 000
 
Source: Commuter Operators 2017 National Budget Consultations (Figures provided by the Commuter 
Omnibus Association) 
 
From Table 4, it is very unlikely that the government may want to introduce competitive 
tendering which essentially means that the number of vehicles would be reduced. All service 
suppliers with the exception of ICZ, driving schools and medical doctors are Government 
related. Furthermore, informants from the commuter omnibus operators associations raised 
grievances about the multiplicity of regulatory institutions from both central and local 
government who have a host of conflicting instruments for generating revenue thus creating a 
harsh operational environment. Operators are dealing with at least three separate ministries 
(Ministries of Transport, Home Affairs and Local Government) to do their business. This 
creates unnecessary red tape that results in the high cost of doing business.  
 
Poor or partial policy implementation 
 
Another delay in the implementation of bus tendering system in Harare is poor or partial policy 
implementation. Study findings have shown that there is a general lack of commitment to 
policy implementation. Policy pronouncements are rarely accompanied by action plans 
detailing the implementation matrix, and as such, most policy announcements suffer a natural 
death. In Zimbabwe, non-policy implementation has become an institutional culture without 
accountability. Further compounding the non-policy implementation problem is that strategy 
execution/implementation requires a level of managerial capability that is lacking among the 
policy implementers. 
 
Operators’ Associations differential interests and power struggles  
 
As highlighted earlier on, currently, public transport in Harare is wholly provided by indigenous 
private players. Although these players are legally recognised by both the local and central 
government, they still remain largely informal owing to their operational characteristics, such 
as touting, violation of traffic rules and over loading of passengers. In the recent past, these 
operators have formed their own associations to somehow achieve self-regulation. Example 
of these include However the GHACO and ZNCOOO. Despite this attempt, evidence from 
these association has shown that these two associations do not work closely with each other 
and there is subtle war for membership and denigrating of the other association. ZNCOO 
claims to represent the operators at national level and GHACO posits that it represent 
operators from Harare. Other smaller route based operators such as the Urban Commuter 
Operators (UCOZ) claim to have their own interests which serve a single route from Harare 
city Centre to a certain neighbourhood. A critical review of these association modus operandi 
revealed that they are driven by the desire for power and money generation through 
subscriptions by members. However, members of the associations have expressed that they 
are not getting real value in joining these associations; as a result the membership does not 
grow. Consequently, most operators belong to neither of these associations. This scenario 
may mean that competitive tendering may face a serious hurdle if these antagonistic 
mechanisms amongst the associations persist.  
 
Lessons learnt 
 
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the urban public transport system is neither 
simple to comprehend nor easy to deal with. Policy advocacy for a tendered bus system in 
Zimbabwe and perhaps in other typical developing countries have to grapple with the rather 
complex nature of public transport. This is largely because urban public transport is such a 
key economic sector that attracts diversified and often contradictory interests. The evidence 
shows that the Government of Zimbabwe has adopted a laissez fair, (albeit a hands-off) 
approach in implementing bus tendering as a way of dealing with the challenges posed by the 
unregulated informal public transport system. The government is playing a delicate balance 
between the economic gains and the negative externalities generated by the informal public 
transport sector. Urban transport in Zimbabwe represents a problem that is difficult or 
impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that are 
often difficult to recognise.  
 
The complexity in dealing and altering the prevailing urban public transport system in Harare, 
Zimbabwe and other developing cities has significant implications for the practice of public 
transport planning. In particular, the difficulty with predicting the effects of interventions in 
detail raises questions about the purpose of planning at large, and what approaches would 
best achieve that purpose. Some factors supporting the status quo and the restraining forces 
towards a desired change (bus tendering) are illustrated in Figure 5 
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Figure 5: The Informal Public Transport (IPT) driver behaviour and regulatory policy reinforcing 
loop in Harare  Source: Constructed by Authors. 
 
From Figure 5, it can be seen that urban public transport in Zimbabwe is immersed in a 
complex web of mainly regulatory factors generating, exacerbating and sustaining the current 
system. Further the restraining forces against the introduction of a more sustainable public 
transport system are shown. The major lesson derived from this research is that there is need 
for detailed diagnostic studies to systematically analyse the deep-rooted political and 
economic factors or pressures that support the status quo (restraining forces) and those 
pressures that support change in the desired direction (driving forces) towards a tendered bus 
system. An injudicious and rushed approach to introducing a tendered bus system or any other 
alternative form of public transport that may ‘do away’ with the prevailing informal public 
transport system is likely to be futile.  
DESTRUCTIVE AND CUT THROAT COMPETITION 
 Inter-modal competition (Kombi-Pirate taxi) 
 Intra-modal competition (Kombi-Kombi; Pirate-Pirate)  
Unregulated 
importation of 
kombis 
Dangerous driving 
manoeuvres and 
tailgating 
AN INFLUX OF 
MINIBUSES 
IPT, a revenue generation 
enterprise through tax and traffic 
fines hence a lax Government 
approach 
The fully deregulated 
policy environment allows 
for easy market entry 
Creation of incidental bus 
termini impeding efficient 
traffic flow 
 Limited termini capacity 
 Suppressed travel demand  
 Weak enforcement  
NEGATIVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
EXTERNALITIES  
Picking up and dropping 
off passengers at 
undesignated sites 
Disregard of traffic 
rules leading to traffic 
collisions and fatalities 
Revenue motivated and not Deterrent 
motivated traffic fines by the police, the 
sector has literally become a ‘cash cow’ 
for the Government 
A source of 
employment for 
many urban youths 
Inadequate and weak enforcement, 
HCC traffic enforcement has no 
arresting powers, is ill resourced and 
ill staffed 
The Local Authority has ‘tied 
hands’ in attempting at serious 
regulation due to political 
interference. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The study has shown that the concept of bus competitive tendering is known and well 
appreciated. The consensus view favoured an open tender based contract for high density 
routes with a maximum contract period of six years. Competitive tendering is envisaged to 
bring benefits such as transparency, a reliable urban public transport service, an affordable 
public transport system, and creating order on the road network among others.  
 
Notwithstanding the desire for a formal public transport system in the major urban areas of 
Zimbabwe, competitive bus tendering system in Harare is far from being realised. The factors 
that stand against competitive bus tendering include inter alia, poor infrastructure, corruption, 
and paucity of technical, managerial skills and disharmony among existing operators 
associations. The present public transport system, albeit in its chaotic state, is generating 
substantial revenue for the Government. Revenue is generated both through legal and illegal 
means. 
 
This study has revealed the general lack of commitment to policy implementation. Five years 
after enunciating a policy position, no action has been taken. Non policy implementation has 
become an institutional culture. Policy makers are good at crafting policy documents and 
implementation is weak.  
 
The study provides valuable lessons to other developing countries. As stated earlier in this 
paper, public transport in many cities of Africa is in a bad state. Notwithstanding the 
unpalatable state of public transport, competitive tendering is not widely practiced. There is 
therefore need for a detailed diagnostic study to analyse the deep rooted political and 
economic factors or pressures that impede a movement from the status quo. 
 
Finally, it has to be pointed out that in this study, the respondents were slightly skewed towards 
the academic sector. The ease of access to this sector by the researchers has resulted in such 
a slant. The authors acknowledge the shortcoming as there are other key stakeholders such 
as Chamber of Industries, Residents Associations whose views on the subject need to be 
ascertained.    
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